Elites and Institutional Persistence by Robinson, James A.
 
Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2010 
* Harvard University, USA, E-mail: jrobinson@gov.harvard.edu 
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on The Role of Elites in Economic 
Development, directed by Alice Amsden, James Robinson, and Alisa DiCaprio. 
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to the research programme by the 
governments of Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 
Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida) and the United Kingdom 
(Department for International Development—DFID). 
ISSN 1798-7237  ISBN 978-92-9230-323-5 
Working Paper No. 2010/85 
 
Elites and Institutional Persistence 
 





Particular sets of institutions, once they become established in a society, have a strong 
tendency to persist. In this paper I argue that understanding how elites form and 
reproduce is key to understanding the persistence of institutions over time. I illustrate 
this idea with a simple political economy theory of institutions and through examples 
from Liberia, the US, South Africa and Germany I show how elites influence 
institutions. To change institutions requires having an understanding of how reforms 
influence the preferences, capabilities and strategies of elites. 
 
Keywords: elites, political economy, persistence of institutions  
JEL classification: D02, D72, N40, O43  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 




UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Typescript prepared by the Author. 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 









There is a great deal of consensus amongst social scientists that the main explanation for com-
parative economic performance is variation in economic institutions, construed broadly enough
to include economic policies. This consensus reaches from economics (North and Thomas, 1973,
North, 1990, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002), though sociology (Evans, 1995)
to political science (Amsden, 1989, Haggard, 1990, Wade, 1990). Prosperous countries have
economic institutions and policies which create the incentives necessary for sustained factor
accumulation and technical change. These involve the protection of property rights and a
whole gamut of institutions which make markets work and create a level playing ￿eld so that
those with ideas and talent can exploit them. They also involve government policies which
provide public goods and key inputs which stimulate market activities. Poor countries lack
such institutions.
The acceptance of the role of comparative institutions in development leads to many im-
portant questions, perhaps the most fundamental of which is why do institutions di⁄er? To
answer this question one needs a theory of institutions. The most natural approach is to treat
institutions as an endogenous political choice of society which di⁄ers in di⁄erent societies be-
cause of di⁄erences in political institutions and the distribution of political power which map
preferences over institutions into institutional outcomes - something I will call the ￿ political
equilibrium￿ . When it comes to explaining why the political equilibria of societies vary, most
scholars take a deeply historical approach. For instance, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson￿ s
(2001, 2002) empirical approach was based on exploiting the experience of European colonial-
ism as a source of variation in institutions. They argued that signi￿cant institutional variation
in the colonial world was caused by di⁄erences in the circumstances found by colonizing pow-
ers in di⁄erent parts of the world. Here political institutions and the distribution of power
are simple, the colonial powers dominated and created the institutions that suited them best.
Some of these sets of institutions were consistent with long-run growth, others were not. Evans
(1995) instead argued that the historical legacy of state institutions and bureaucracy had a
key impact on the choice and success of industrialization strategies. In his theory East Asian
1countries were able to industrialize because they bene￿tted from the legacy of bureaucracy
which had historically evolved to rule China.
All such historical arguments build in a lot of institution persistence. Indeed the theory
of institutional variation which emerges from this work is premised on the observation that
institutions tend to be highly inertial. Once a set of institutions comes to dominate society it
tends to persist for long periods of time though the institutional path can certainly change in
the context of major ￿ critical junctures￿ . These could include factors external to a society such
the imposition of colonial rule, inter-state war, or globalization, but they also include changes
endogenous to society such as revolution, or industrialization and the rise of the middle class.
From this perspective to ask why a society has the institutions that it does one has to look
at its history to see what forces have bu⁄eted it and the impact they have had and how a
society has or has not changed during particular critical junctures. Countries have di⁄erent
institutions because they have di⁄erent histories, though obviously there may be forces for
institutional convergence and societies which were a⁄ected by common shocks and forces may
well have similar institutions. This is true in much of Latin America, for example, which
experienced relatively similar patterns of colonial rule, or in West Africa where the slave trade
had similar e⁄ects on institutions in many countries. They may also respond in similar ways
at subsequent critical junctures. For instance, the impact of globalization in Latin America
in the late 19th century with the great economic opportunities it presented generally led to
a deterioration in economic institutions such as property rights and political institutions as it
fostered the consolidation of more autocratic regimes in countries like Guatemala and Mexico.
Similarly in West Africa, the abolition of the slave trade and the inauguration of ￿ legitimate
commerce￿led to similar responses all along the coast from Asante to Dahomey. The response
of societies to shocks was ￿ltered through the existing political equilibrium in much the same
way as Postan (1944) had previously analyzed the institutional implications of commercial
expansion in late medieval Europe (see also Brenner, 1976). This is to say that there is a large
amount of path dependence in the institutions of a society.
But these ambitious claims about institutional persistence also generate puzzles. For in-
2stance, one of the most famous system of forced labor in colonial Latin America was the mining
Mita of Peru. Dell (2007) has shown that compared to places outside the catchment area of
the Mita, those in the Mita area have 1/3 lower household consumption today. These areas
also have fewer public goods, particularly roads and until recently education, and farmers tend
to be much more involved in subsistence production. But despite these empirical links between
the past and today and even if the Peruvian Mita lasted around 250 years, it was abolished
200 years ago. What is the mechanism via which its e⁄ects persist today?
In this chapter I argue that a crucial factor in explaining the persistence of institutions is
how elites form around sets of institutions and how elites persist and reproduce over time. By
an elite I simply mean a distinct group within a society which enjoys privileged status and
exercises decisive control over the organization of that society (though this will be a matter of
degree in reality). In some situations it is much easier to identify who the elite was or is. In
colonial Peru, for instance, we can plausibly argue that the elite consisted of Spanish settlers,
the colonial state bureaucracy (often manned by non-settlers or peninsulares) and indigenous
elites who cooperated with and were co-opted by the colonial state. My argument also implies
that a key factor in institutional change will be what happens to the elite. Change can be
triggered by disunity of elites or elite decay, though it can also be triggered by changes in elite
preferences.
To see how this might work, let￿ s return to Dell￿ s analysis of the Mita. She shows that
the way this particular institution in￿ uenced long-run economic outcomes, even after it had
been abolished, was precisely because of the impact it had on elites and elite interests. During
the colonial period Spanish settlers were only able to form large landholdings outside the Mita
areas because the colonial state wanted to stop them competing for the mining labor. After
independence when the Mita was abolished, it was these settler elites who ran the country.
In consequence they were able to in￿ uence the construction of infrastructure and allocation
of public goods, which went to areas where they owned land, outside the Mita zone. In the
case of the Mita the colonial institution has had persistent long-run e⁄ects because of the way
it in￿ uenced the spatial distribution of the elite and its investments and interests. This elite
3persisted over time and that is why the impact of the Mita also persists.
In the Peruvian case, and in Latin America more generally, there has been a lot of well doc-
umented persistency of elite families and identities.1 Yet a theory of institutional persistence
based on the persistence of families and dynasties can only be a part of what is required to
explain the world. To see why consider the many claims made about the persistence between
colonial institutions and the post-independence development patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Young, 1994, Mamdani, 1996, Cooper, 2002). In these cases a colonial elite was replaced by
a largely new and di⁄erent elite, so the mechanisms via which the Mita persisted do not seem
to be relevant to these cases. But this ￿ circulation of elites￿does not imply that elites are not
relevant for institutional persistence. This is because the preferences and behavior of elites are
highly path dependent, a phenomenon reminiscent of what Michels (1915) called the ￿ iron law
of oligarchy￿(related ideas are due to Mosca, 1939, and Pareto, 1968). Michels observed that
(1915, pp. 353-354).
￿society cannot exist without a ￿dominant￿or ￿political￿class, and that the
ruling class, while its elements are subject to frequent partial renewal, nevertheless
constitutes the only factor of su¢ ciently durable e¢ cacy in the history of human
development. [T]he government, or, .. the state, cannot be anything other than
the organization of a minority. It is the aim of this minority to impose upon the
rest of society a ￿legal order￿which is the outcome of the exigencies of dominion
and of the exploitation of the mass ... Even when the discontent of the masses
culminates in a successful attempt to deprive the bourgeoisie of power, this is ...
e⁄ected only in appearance; always and necessarily there springs from the masses
a new organized minority which raises itself to the rank of a governing class.￿
Michels observation was that society is always governed by an elite who organize things for
their own bene￿t and that a new elite could replace an old one with little real change. It is
natural to extend this argument to include the idea that how a new elites does things depends
1This is particularly well documented in Central America, see Stone (1990) and Paige (1997) in general and
Casaœs Arzœ (2007) for Guatemala.
4on how the old elite did things (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2007). Thus even in cases like Sub-
Saharan Africa where elite identities changed after independence, the way they behaved was
heavily contingent on the institutional environment they inherited and the way that colonial
elites had behaved. Thus elites are again crucial to explaining institutional persistence.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section I sketch the simple political economy
approach to institutions which unlerpins my approach. In this context I give a speci￿c example
of an elite, the Americo-Liberians of Liberia. Section 3 then discussed institutional persistence
and the key role of elites in institutional persistence using examples from the history of the
US South and South Africa. Section 4 applies this approach to institutional change, again
arguing for a key role for elites. I here return to the US South and contrast the role of the elite
in institutional change there with what happened in Europe during the French Revolution.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Elements of a Theory of Institutions
I now brie￿ y discuss a theory of institutions (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005,
and Acemoglu and Robinson, 2011). Economic institutions matter for economic growth be-
cause they shape the incentives of key economic actors in society, in particular, they in￿ uence
investments in physical and human capital and technology, and the organization of produc-
tion. Economic institutions not only determine the aggregate economic growth potential of the
economy, but also the distribution of resources in the future. In other words, they in￿ uence
not only the size of aggregate income, but how income is divided among di⁄erent groups and
individuals in society.2
Economic institutions and policies are endogenous and are determined as collective choices
of the society. Clearly, there is no guarantee that all individuals and groups will prefer the
same set of economic institutions because, as noted above, di⁄erent economic institutions lead
to di⁄erent income distributions. Consequently, there will be a con￿ ict of interest over the
2As I noted in the introduction include economic policies along with economic institutions. Like institutions,
policies are chosen by those with political power and they have large impacts on the incentive structure of
society so for the purposes of the discussion it is not important to distinguish between them.
5choice of economic institutions. In such a situation it will be the distribution of political power
in society that determines what institution are chosen. The group with more political power
will tend to secure the set of economic institutions that it prefers.
The distribution of political power in society is also endogenous, however. Following Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2006) I distinguish between two components of political power: de jure
(institutional) and de facto political power. Here de jure political power refers to all types of
power that originates from the political institutions in society. Political institutions determine
the constraints on and the incentives of key actors in the political sphere. Examples of po-
litical institutions include the form of government, for example, democracy vs. dictatorship
or autocracy, and the extent of constraints on politicians and political elites. There is more
to political power than political institutions, however. A group of individuals, even if they
are not allocated power by political institutions, for example as speci￿ed in the constitution,
may nonetheless possess political power. Namely, they can revolt, use arms, hire mercenaries,
co-opt the military, or use economically costly but largely peaceful protests in order to impose
their wishes on society. I refer to this type of political power as de facto political power, which
itself has two sources. First, it depends on the ability of the group in question to solve its col-
lective action problem, i.e., to ensure that people act together, even when any individual may
have an incentive to free ride. Second, the de facto power of a group depends on its economic
resources, which determine both their ability to use (or misuse) existing political institutions
and also their option to hire and use force against di⁄erent groups.
It will be composition of de facto and de jure power in society that determines the actual
power of a group or set of interests and this will determine which economic institutions arise.
It is obvious from this description that there are large forces here which generate persistence in
the political economy equilibrium. If a certain group is empowered by the existing structure of
political power then they will choose economic institutions that favor them. This will increase
their wealth and be one channel through which their de facto power will persist or increase.
Moreover, those who hold power today will not only be able to determine economic institutions
today. They will also be able to determine political institutions in the future which tends to
6cement the de jure power of such a group. Hence the distribution of political power and
thus economic institutions is naturally highly persistent over time. Nevertheless, there may
be intrinsic dynamics or shocks to the system that lead to redistributions of power and thus
changes in economic institutions. It may also be the case that the incentives of those in power
are changed, perhaps because of technical innovation or new market opportunities, and this
may change economic institutions we well.
This dynamic vision emphasizes that those with power today take decisions not just to
maximize their income today, but also to maintain their grip on power. These goals are often
in contradiction. This can be for the simple reason that economic policies which increase even
the incomes of elites today may increase the incomes of opponents even more, thus in￿ uencing
the future distribution of de facto power. It may also be that, as pointed out in the seminal
study by Bates (1981), good economic policies are not good politics. In particular though
providing public goods may increase the incomes of the elite, staying in power may be better
achieved by using redistributive instruments which can be targeted at supporters and withheld
from opponents.
Institutions therefore are chosen by those with the power to do so. In many societies this
group is small and coherent enough to sensibly be called an elite. It is useful to give a very
speci￿c example of one such elite whose preferences and coherence have long determined the
organization of the economy in Liberia.
2.1 Example of an Elite: The American-Liberians
The modern nation of Liberia was born in 1820 by the American Colonization Society (ACS)
as a home for freed and repatriated African slaves. In 1847 Liberia became independent of
the ACS and the year 1877 saw the emergence of the True Whig Party (TWP) which would
dominate politics until the coup of Samuel Doe in 1980. The TWP party was the political
vehicle for the Americo-Liberians, the decedents of the freed slaves brought back to Africa by
the ACS. In the 1960s the Americo-Liberians comprised about 3-5% of the population and
completely dominated all the countries￿institutions (see Fraenkel, 1964, for a picture of the
7society in the early 1960s). As Dalton (1964, p. 581) put it
￿to understand Liberian politics, knowledge of kinship connections is more use-
ful than knowledge of the Liberian constitution.￿
The Americo-Liberians set themselves up as an elite, ruling the indigenous Africans. They
structured economic institutions to extract rents from the rest of society and political institu-
tions to guarantee their monopoly of power. These economic institutions included slavery as
late as the 1920s and even in the 1960s 1/4 of the labor force was mobilized via compulsion. In
most economies it is a stylized fact that wage payments represent about 2/3 of national income.
In Liberia the stylized facts were rather di⁄erent. As a result of the severe labor repression in
1950 wages were 19.8% of national income and in 1960 they were 27.1%. Moreover, as in the
above discussion, the elite were not just concerned with the distribution of economic bene￿ts,
they were also concerned about the distribution of political power. As Dalton (1964, p. 581)
observed
￿the economic backwardness of Liberia is not attributable to the lack of re-
sources or to domination by foreign ￿nancial or political interests. The underlying
di¢ culty is rather that the traditional Americo-Liberian rulers, who fear losing
political control to the tribal people, have not allowed those changes to take place
which are necessary to develop the national society and economy.￿
The nature of the elite is well brought out by Figure 1 which shows how the country was
run in 1960 by the family of Presidency of William V.S. Tubman who ruled from 1944 to 1971.
President Tubman￿ s brother was the Ambassador to the USA. His brother￿ s brother in law
was Ambassador to Germany. President Tubman￿ s father was the President of the General
Confederation of Labor, the main association of labor unions and his grandfather was the
Vice-President of Liberia. His granduncle was the Senator of Monsanto County, which is the
county where the capital Monrovia is. Another granduncle was the secretary of commerce,
whose step brother was the President of the central bank. It was a family business embedded
8within the big family of the Americo-Liberians. Figure 2 shows some simple data on historical
political institutions in Liberia from the Polity IV project.3 The ￿rst is the Polity score which
is a commonly used measure of how democratic a country is. This score runs from 10, the
most democratic, to -10, the least. I also include Polity￿ s index of ￿ constraints on the executive￿
which runs from 7, the most constraints, to 1, the least. The ￿gure forcefully illustrates the
impact of the consolidation of the power of the Americo-Liberians under the TWP.
3 Elites and Institutional Persistence
The ￿ model￿of the last section suggests two obvious mechanisms of institutional persistence.
First, those with power today choose political institutions in the future and they naturally tend
to choose those with reproduce their de jure power. Second, those with power today determine
economic institutions which tend to distribute resources in their favor thus reproducing their de
facto power. So once an elite has the power to determine the choice of institutions this power
will tend to persist over time. This power may well be handed down to the children of the elite
so that elite dynasties form, as was indeed the case in Liberia. The power of such dynastic
elites to control economic institutions and thus patterns of development is very powerful and
can even bridge revolution and other large shocks. Moreover, it is consistent with quite large
changes in the speci￿cs details of institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008a) because, for
example, there are many ways to extract rents from labor. As an example of these issues let
me consider the economic and political history of the US South.
3.1 Persistence of Elites and Institutions in the US South4
Before the Civil War the US South was run by plantation owners, and the economy was based
on a system of slavery and labor-intensive cotton production. The South was relatively poor
(about 70% of the national level of GDP per-capita), there was little manufacturing industry,
low urbanization, and a far lower density of canals and railroads than in the rest of the country,
particularly the North (see Bateman and Weiss, 1981, Wright, 1986, Ransom and Sutch, 2001).
3http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
4This section is based on Acemoglu and Robinson (2008a,b).
9The defeat of the South in the Civil War on the surface led to major alteration in economic
and political institutions. Slavery was abolished and freed male slaves given the right to vote.
One might have anticipated a dramatic change in the incentive environment and economic out-
comes. Instead, what emerged was a labor-intensive, low wage, low education and repressive
economy that looked remarkably like the antebellum Southern economy. Economic perfor-
mance got relatively worse in the South after the Civil War with GDP per-capita declining to
about 50% of the national average where it stayed until the 1940s.
The reason for this is quite simple. Despite losing the Civil War, the traditional landed
elites could sustain their political control of the South, particularly after Reconstruction ended
in 1877 and the Union army was withdrawn. These elites were able to block economic reforms
that might have undermined their power, such as the distribution of 50 acres and a mule to
each freed slave, and they were able to use their local political power to disenfranchise blacks
and re-exert control over the labor force. They did this through the use of Black Codes,
Vagrancy Laws, Ku Klux Klan and Jim Crow (Woodward, 1955). Table 1 vividly shows the
persistence of the landed southern elites in four ￿ black belt￿counties of Alabama. This was an
area at the heart of the cotton economy. The table, from Wiener, 1978, uses micro data from
the US census to identify the 25 largest landowners in 1870 in these four counties in terms
of land values. The other columns then show which of these 25 were amongst the largest 25
landowners in 1860 and 1850. One sees that there is amazing persistence in the identity of
these big landowners which is only slightly disrupted by the Civil War.
In the US South even though political institutions changed in such a way as to redistribute
de jure political power away from the white elites, the elite was still very cohesive as a group.
As a consequence they were able to compensate for the change in political institutions through
the use of de facto power. It is perhaps not surprising that the plantation elites had such a
relative advantage over the newly freed slaves in terms of their ability to act collectively. In
consequence they maintained their political control (see Wiener, 1978, for a fascinating study
of this). Though political control no longer allowed slavery to be used, there were many other
ways that the cotton planters could extract rents and repress the labor force. For economic
10performance however, there was little di⁄erence in which sorts of method of labor repression
was used. The economy did not improve because the incentive environment for the mass of
the population persisted.
Thus to understand the long-run relative economic backwardness of the US South and how
this persisted after the Civil War it is crucial to examine the role and power and persistence
of the Southern landed elite.
3.2 Circulation of Elites and Institutional Persistence in South Africa
As I observed in the introduction, there are clear examples where old elites are replaced by
new ones, but where one also sees continuity in economic institutions. I argued there that a
potential explanation for such a phenomenon is that the strategies of elites are path dependent.
The fact that an incumbent elite organized economic institutions in a particular way makes
this relatively attractive for a new elite to do the same. It may also be the case that not
all elements of the elite change. In many former British Sub-Saharan African colonies, for
example, ￿ traditional rulers￿who had been heavily used by the British to rule the colonies
indirectly, maintained their power and positions after independence, creating a large element
of direct elite persistence. In other cases, such as South Africa, the transition from Apartheid
and white rule to democracy in 1994 led to the destruction of the white political elite, but left
a large amount of the white economic elite in place.
The South African case is an interesting one to consider the rami￿cations of elite circulation
for institutional persistence. After the election of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1994
one would have anticipated large changes from this redistribution of political power towards
the black majority. This event did lead to the abolition of the last few apartheid laws (others,
such as the Colour Bar had already been abolished in the 1980s) and clear change in the power
relations between elites. What else might happen could have been predicted by the historical
commitments of the ANC at least since the formulation of the Freedom Charter in 1955 which
stated
￿The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be re-
11stored to the people; The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly
industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; All other
industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of the people;￿ 5
Such a goal was also con￿rmed by Nelson Mandela after his release from prison and during
his ￿rst public address to South African big business in May 1990
￿it is quite obvious that the economic power relations represented by the exces-
sive concentration of power in a few white hands have to change ... one of South
Africa￿ s imperatives is to end white domination in all its forms, to deracialise the
exercise of economic power￿ .
But a prediction based on such statements would have been a bad one. In fact the
ANC quickly abandoned the radical economic policies which it had advocated while oppos-
ing Apartheid and adopted prudent market friendly ones instead. Since 1994 while GDP
per-capita has grown, income inequality has risen substantially, there has been practically no
redistribution of assets to o⁄set the huge heritage of exploitation and expropriation by whites.
Average real wages have actually fallen. This has happened even though South Africa was
probably already the most unequal country in the world. These outcomes are not what you
might have expected given the history of the country, but they are what Robert Michels might
have expected.
In 1993, just before the end of white rule, the ￿nancial services company Sanlam, a pillar of
the Apartheid economy, sold 10% of its stake in Metropolitan life to a black owned consortium
led by Nthato Motlana a former secretary of the ANC￿ s Youth League and one-time doctor
to Nelson Mandela and Bishop Desmond Tutu. Since then white ￿rms have systematically
formed links with prominent ANC politicians and their spouses/relatives, putting them on the
boards of directors and selling discounted shares to consortia formed by then. This process has
been called Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Though initially this process was obviously
aimed at securing property rights for whites by giving the ANC elite a stake in capitalism, it
5http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/charter.html
12clearly has also created a vested interest for this new elite in a highly concentrated industrial
structure and existing entry barriers and rents. Moreover, many speci￿c aspects of Apartheid
still remain, such as the spatial distribution of the population. Though part of Black Economic
Empowerment is being used as an instrument of a¢ rmative action to promote the economic
interests of black South Africans more broadly, the ￿rst-order e⁄ect has been to greatly enrich
the politically powerful new elite. A simple illustration of this comes from Table 2, which
reproduces the CV of Max Sisulu a prominent ANC politician and son of Walter Sisulu, one of
the historic ￿gures of the party. This shows that not only has Sisulu been an ANC member of
Parliament but is also a member of the ANC￿ s executive committee, the party￿ s governing body.
The last section shows the extraordinary number of directorships that Sisulu has, including
many where he is a non-executive director. This is what a lot of Black Economic Empowerment
means in practice, large companies giving sinecures to politically important people so that the
pre-existing economic institutions persist.
Figure 3 gives some sense of the scale of this phenomenon. In it I mapped the connec-
tions between important ANC politicians (members of the national and state legislatures and
members of the executive committee since 1994) and companies by looking at their boards of
directors. Sisulu is halfway up the right-hand side. Most prominent are such ￿gures as Cyril
Ramaphosa, the former leader of the miner￿ s union who was the chief negotiation for the ANC
in the bargaining which led to the end of Apartheid. Also prominent is Tokyo Sexwale, like
Nelson Mandela a former inmate of Robben Island prison during the Apartheid era.
Though there are di⁄erent ways to interpret this phenomenon, a plausible one is that it is
an example of the iron law of oligarchy in action. Though the changes in political institutions
that took place in 1994 signi￿cantly redistributed de jure political power in South Africa, it
did not necessarily lead to large changes in economic institutions. This was for several reasons.
First, the previous set of institutions generated huge rents for the white elite, it can do the
same for a new, mostly black, elite. Second, the old elite was heterogeneous and the white
economic elite still hangs on and has a great deal of de facto power to try to in￿ uence the
nature of economic institutions in post-Apartheid South Africa.
134 Elites and Institutional Change
The two examples of the last section were designed to show that even in what appears to
be institutional change, there can be persistence and that to understand this persistence one
needs to think about the role of elites. But we also observe important transitions in institu-
tions toward political equilibria that lead to better economic performance and higher welfare.
Institutional change will arise if there is a real change in the political equilibrium - in the dis-
tribution of power in society, for example towards those with a vested interest in socially more
desirable institutions. Change can also happen when the parameters of the system alter in a
way which leads the interests of the elites who control power to change. I call this ￿ re-orienting
elites￿ . Change can also occur when there is a big enough change that the iron law of oligarchy
is broken. I shall refer to this as ￿ breaking elites￿ .
I illustrate these ideas by returning ￿rst to the US South where both mechanisms are in
play. I then focus on the breaking elites mechanism in the era of the French Revolution.
4.1 Re-orienting Elites: The Emergence of Good Institutions in the US
South6
Starting in the 1940s rapid change began to take place in the political equilibrium of the US
South. This went along with institutional change. This took place in the context of several
momentous changes. For one the isolation of the southern labor market ended in the context
of mass emigration (Wright, 1999). There were large changes in technology, particularly the
mechanization of cotton picking after 1950 (Heinicke, 1994). There was the ￿nal collapse of
institutionalized racial discrimination in labor markets and social life and re-enfranchisement
of Blacks culminating in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Besley, Persson and Sturm, 2010).
The consequence of these changes was that southern economy converged to the US average.
These changes were driven by a number of interacting forces which both changed the
ability of Southern elites to maintain the previous system and also their incentives to do so.
The ability of whites to continue with the institutions which had been in e⁄ect since the
6This section is based on Acemoglu and Robinson (2008a,b).
14late 19th century was severely undermined by the fact that blacks in South ￿nally solved
the collective action problem (McAdam, 1983). The civil rights movement made much of the
previous system unenforceable. Black collective action was facilitated by the intervention of
the federal government. At the same time there was a much smaller ability and incentive for
the whites to continue to repress labor. The huge migration of blacks out of the South could no
longer be controlled. At the same time technological change, particularly the mechanization of
cotton picking made it far less important to repress labor. Thus the preferences of the white
elite changed while at the same time their power diminished.
There was real change therefore in the political equilibrium in the South which led to much
better economic institutions. The old economy based on extracting rents from the blacks
crumbled, along with all the negative externalities that it had for other parts of the economy.
No new elite arose to carry on repressing black labor using di⁄erent instruments and the
situation did not turn on its￿head with blacks extracting rents from whites. This may have
been because of the technological changes that took place at the same time, but more likely
it was because the South is embedded in a larger economy with well functioning institutions.
This latter feature of the South may have considerable raised the opportunity cost of having
bad economic institutions.
4.2 Breaking Elites: The Economic E⁄ects of the French Revolution
In the US South the elite was not overthrown. But as we saw above, this is neither necessary
nor su¢ cient for institutional change to take place. Sometimes, however, the overthrow of an
elite does lead to su¢ cient changes in institutions that when a new elite forms it does so with
di⁄erent speci￿c investment and interests. It may also be that this new elite assumes power
with these di⁄erent interests. In this case the breaking of elites can come with real institutional
change.
An important example of this phenomenon occurred during the period of the French Rev-
olution (Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson and Robinson, 2009). After 1792 French armies invaded
large parts of Western and Southern Europe and when they did so they implemented many
15of the institutional reforms which had been innovated in France after the Revolution. These
reforms included the creation of republican constitutions, abolition of feudalism and introduc-
tion of equality before the law, abolition of guilds, introduction of the civil code. For example
in the Rhineland, even though some scholar emphasize that there was a fair amount of plunder
and resulting resentment by the local population (e.g., Blanning, 1983) the importance of the
revolutionary reforms appears undeniable. In 1798 the seigneurial regime and the guilds were
abolished (Blanning, 1983, pp. 137 and 155), and this paved the way to a relatively free labor
market. There were also signi￿cant legal changes with a commercial court in Aachen in 1794,
and followed with similar courts elsewhere in the Rhineland (Diefendorf, 1980, pp. 159-160),
which were to play an important role in the creation of commercial and industrial businesses
in the years to follow. Subsequently the civil code (Code NapolØon) was implemented. Kisch
emphasizes the economic importance of this (1989, p. 212):
￿When the many strands of commercial legislation were subsequently consoli-
dated in the Code NapolØon, the Rhineland (on the left bank) was not only given a
most up-to-date legal framework, but also a system of government in close harmony
with the needs of a buoyantly industrializing society.￿
Instead of the traditional elite by 1810 merchants/manufacturers comprised about half
the members of Conseil General (municipal administrations) in leading Rhineland towns
(Diefendorf, 1980, p. 115), and businesspeople were also well represented in the higher
department-level Conseil General.
Reforms were also systematically introduced into other parts of Germany which were made
into satellite kingdoms by Napoleon. For example, Connelly (1965, p. 184) notes that in the
constitution of Westphalia, which was issued at Fontainebleau on November 15, 1807,
￿the king￿ s subjects were guaranteed equality before the law and religious lib-
erty; serfdom and feudal rights were abolished; noble titles were a¢ rmed, but were
to command no special rights, privileges or o¢ ces. Taxes were to fall equally on
all classes in all parts of the kingdom.￿
16Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson and Robinson (2009) show that parts of Europe which were
reformed by the French between 1792 and 1815 experienced signi￿cantly more rapid economic
growth and increases in urbanization in the 19th century compared to those parts which were
not reformed. This is also true just comparing the parts of Germany that were reformed to
those that were not.
A crucial part of the mechanism which appears to generate these ￿ndings is the impact of
French invasion and the 1815 Congress of Vienna on elites. After the ￿nal collapse of Napoleon￿ s
Empire the institutional reforms implemented over the previous 25 years su⁄ered various fates.
Within Germany, to a ￿rst approximation, the reforms were most clearly persistent in places
where the old elites did not return. In Germany these were the areas of Napoleonic Germany
that were ceded to Prussia at the Congress of Vienna. The presence of a new elite created by
the reforms and determined to hang onto them mentioned is also central to the argument of
Simms (2004, p. 39) who sums this up as:
￿In western and southern Germany there was no going back to the feudal status
quo ante. The Prussian bureaucrats arriving in the newly acquired Rhine Province
in 1815 found a population determined to hold onto the French law ... The genie
of the reform movement￿ freedom of movement, the standardization of taxation,
the abolition of guilds￿ could not be put back in the bottle.￿
Elsewhere, most notably in Hanover, there was much more of a return to the status quo.
After 1815 the reforms implemented by the French persisted in precisely those areas where old
elites were unable to return. Figure 4, from Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson and Robinson (2010),
breaks down the urbanization rate within Germany, as a proxy for economic development, into
three areas. Those that were never reformed by the French, those that were reformed but were
given to Prussia in 1815, and those that were reformed but not given to Prussia and hence
reverted to their pre-1792 elites. The Figure shows that after 1850 there is a distinct increase
in the rate of growth of urbanization in all three regions but that it is signi￿cantly greater in
the group which was reformed and given to Prussia. The growth in the reformed group taken
17over by Prussia comes from the persistence of reforms implemented by the French which the
Prussians could not, or did not want to reverse. Indeed the Code NapolØon was in force in the
Rhineland until 1900. It was in this part of Germany where new elites emerged and consolidated
during the Revolutionary epoch. One sees that reform followed by the re-implantation of the
old elites did not lead to any more rapid acceleration in urbanization compared to places which
were unreformed since the old elites attempted to unwind the French reforms.
Thus to understand the impact of the reforms brought by the French during the revolu-
tionary period it is crucial to understand how they impacted elites, their interests and their
abilities to reverse and oppose change.
5 Conclusions
The institutions of a society which determine their development potential and prospects are
deeply rooted in the histories of those societies. Once established, institutions persist for long
periods of time. In this chapter I have argued that a key to understanding the persistence of
institutions is the nature of elites: how elites form round sets of institutions and how elites
reproduce and change over time. My argument implies that understanding why poor countries
don￿ t improve their institutions and how to encourage this process via policy necessitates
the study of elites in the developing world. Incumbent elites often bene￿t, economically and
politically, from the institutional status quo (recall my discussion of the Americo-Liberians).
We need to study how elites arise, cohere and act to further their collective interests. We also
need to understand much better how reforms in￿ uence existing and potential elite interests
and strategies.
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Constraint on Chief Executive PolityTable 2: CV of Max Sisulu
Mr. Sisulu
 
was involved in the ANC since his youth, and went into exile in
 
1963, working in the liberation movement in Tanzania, Zambia and other 
parts of Africa. In 1986 he established the ANC’s economics department, and returned to South Africa in 1993 taking a post in government. In 1994 
he became a member of Parliament and in 1997 he was appointed Chief Whip in the National Assembly. 
Education: MA in Political Economy at Piekhanov
 
Institute, Moscow, Russia
Senior Military Commanders Course, Skhodnia, Russia
MA in Public Administration, JFK School of Govt., Harvard University
Work Experience: 
South African National Assembly –
 
Member of Parliament
National Institute of Economics Policy -
 
Director
SA Aerospace, Maritime and Defense Industries Assoc. -
 
Chairman
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